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Abstract—Currently, many Wi-Fi access points are being 
installed in urban areas. This paper considers how this 
infrastructure can be used to assist criminal investigations and 
improve public safety. We propose a criminal investigation 
assistance system that uses multiple wireless local area network 
(LAN) access points and cameras. The proposed “Criminal 
Fishing System” enumerates candidate media access control 
(MAC) addresses of culprits’ mobile devices from probe request 
signals gathered by access points during the period in which a 
culprit is near the scene of an incident. Preliminary experiments 
demonstrated that the proposed system could identify the MAC 
address of the culprit’s device, which would allow authorities to 
capture the culprit’s radiowave fingerprint. After enumerating 
the candidate MAC addresses, the culprit’s usual appearance can 
be obtained by surveilling these MAC addresses, especially when 
it changes less frequently. Moreover, the MAC address itself can 
be admissible as evidence that the culprit was near the scene of an 
incident, given that the MAC address is static, that is, it has not 
changed after the incident, or the original MAC address can be 
retrieved from the randomized MAC address. 
 
Index Terms—Criminal surveillance assistance system, 
Criminal Fishing, Probe request signal, Wireless LAN, Internet of 
Things 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
URRENTLY, the importance of traffic offloading from 
cellular networks to Wi-Fi networks is increasing owing to 
the rapid growth of network traffic [1] caused by the 
proliferation of smartphones and tablet devices. To extend 
Wi-Fi coverage, many Wi-Fi access points (APs) are being 
installed in urban areas. 
Criminal activities, such as graffiti, shoplifting, larceny, and 
kidnapping, occur in urban areas. These incidents cause public 
expenditure and social damage. For example, the total cost for 
of cleaning up graffiti is approximately 12 billion USD per year 
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in the United States [2]. The costs due to shoplifting are 461.5 
billion yen per year in Japan [3] and 44 billion USD per year in 
the United States [4]. 
Against this backdrop, several crime prevention systems 
have been developed. Security cameras that capture photos or 
videos are widely used as security equipment. However, 
installation costs tend to be high, particularly when several 
cameras are installed and connected to a network. Another 
typical problem with security cameras is that a culprit whose 
face is hidden cannot be identified from images. This issue 
cannot be resolved by placing many cameras in a surveillance 
area. 
We consider that using many APs in urban areas as a 
component of a criminal investigation assistance system can 
reduce the incidence of criminal activity and improve public 
safety. Among the several types of signals transmitted from a 
mobile device, some signals contain device identifiers. For 
example, a probe request signal is a signal broadcast by a Wi-Fi 
device to find surrounding Wi-Fi access points (APs), and it 
contains the media access control (MAC) address unique to 
each network interface. This paper describes a criminal 
investigation assistance system that utilizes the probe request 
signals gathered by Wi-Fi APs. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 
2 describes the research background, including brief 
introductions of related studies. Section 3 describes the 
proposed “Criminal Fishing System,” and Section 4 describes a 
preliminary experiment performed using the proposed system. 
Section 5 discusses several associated issues, including ethical 
and privacy issues. Section 6 presents our concluding remarks. 
II. RESEARCH BACKGROUND 
A. Existing crime prevention/detection systems 
Security cameras are widely used as anti-crime equipment 
that record incidents by storing images captured from the scene 
of an incident. They are typically used as part of a closed-circuit 
television (CCTV) system. This system consists of cameras and 
monitors, and all pieces of equipment are connected locally, 
that is, the captured images are not broadcast publicly. 
However, the cost of installing security cameras is high, 
especially when multiple cameras with wired connections are 
to be installed. Another typical issue with security cameras is 
that if culprits hide their face, they cannot be identified from the 
captured images. This issue cannot simply be solved by 
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 installing many security cameras in a surveillance area. 
Park et al. proposed a method [5] that recognizes people’s 
emotions by using wearable sensors, namely, heartbeat sensors 
and temperature sensors. By combining data from these sensors 
with CCTV images, the method detects criminal behaviors. Its 
detection results are stored in a database. iProtect [6] is a 
method based on activity recognition that utilizes sensors 
equipped on a target user's smartphone. The method involves 
anomaly detection; it detects differences between criminal 
behaviors, for instance, assaults, and routine activities. 
However, for detecting criminal behaviors, these methods 
require the attachment of sensing equipment on the target 
person or the use of special software on their smartphones. 
Therefore, these methods are not practical because culprits 
disable crime-detection software or equipment before 
committing a crime. We aim to achieve criminal fishing when 
the smartphone of a target person is simply turned on. 
B. Probe Request signal 
Probe request signals are broadcast when a Wi-Fi device 
searches APs or requests a connection to an AP which has the 
extended service set identifier (ESS-ID) stored as the preferred 
network list (PNL) in the device. There are two methods of 
establishing connections between Wi-Fi devices and APs; 
Active scan, in which a device broadcasts probe request signals 
to the surrounding APs and receives probe responses from the 
APs. Thereafter, procedures to establish a connection between 
them are executed. In passive scan, a beacon signal is broadcast 
periodically by APs to establish network connections. Most 
smartphones broadcast probe request signals at random 
intervals to execute active scan and swiftly establish network 
connections. The time interval with which a Wi-Fi device 
broadcasts probe request signals differs according to the device 
type, its connection state, operating system, and software 
running on the device. Generally, this interval lasts from a few 
seconds to a few minutes. A device tends to broadcast probe 
request signals more frequently when it is not connected to any 
AP and its display is on. 
The following information can be obtained by analyzing 
probe request signals. 
• Sender MAC address 
• RSSI 
• ESS-ID (included only when declared explicitly) 
Currently, about 3.4 billion smartphones are in use 
worldwide [1], and each device broadcasts probe request 
signals when its Wi-Fi function is active. We call this signal as 
“radiowave fingerprint” because it contains the MAC address 
unique to each device. This “radiowave fingerprint” can be 
used to devise a novel security surveillance system by 
combining APs capable of capturing probe request signals and 
web cameras attached onto APs. 
C. MAC spoofing/randomization 
MAC addresses are factory-assigned and unique to each 
network interface. MAC spoofing is a software-based 
technique to change this MAC address. To spoof a MAC 
address, a certain level of technical skill is required. In the case 
of a sudden or minor criminal incident, the culprit is less likely 
to spoof the MAC address of their Wi-Fi device. Notably, to 
spoof a MAC address, most mobile devices also require 
“rooting” or “jail-breaking,” which would make the device 
vulnerable to cyber attacks. In case that the spoofed MAC 
address is changed infrequently, the mobile device can still be 
tracked in a manner similar to a device with the 
factory-assigned (not-spoofed) MAC address. Therefore, MAC 
address spoofing itself is not a very efficient counter measure 
against mobile device tracking. 
Recently, several operating systems (OSs) have been 
equipped with MAC address randomization. For example, iOS 
10 uses a randomized MAC address for Wi-Fi scanning most of 
the time [7]. The latest version of Android OS and Windows 
OS are also equipped with MAC address randomization, but 
very few network modules and drivers are capable of 
randomizing MAC addresses; most Android/Windows devices 
cannot randomize MAC addresses. Recent research [8] has 
revealed that current MAC randomization is not effective to 
avoid mobile device tracking. The best way for a person to 
avoid being tracked when using Wi-Fi signals is to turn off their 
mobile devices. 
In this paper, we implement a prototype of the proposed 
system and conduct a preliminary experiment without 
considering issues pertaining to MAC spoofing and 
randomization. Discussions related to these technologies are 
given later in the paper. 
III. CRIMINAL FISHING SYSTEM 
The proposed Criminal Fishing System finds clues to 
identify culprits by their “radiowave fingerprint,” in addition to 
their camera images. Note that the MAC address is unique to 
each mobile device (network interface), not to each person, 
even if the address is factory-assigned. Therefore, aim of this 
system is not to identify a culprit but to find a clue to identify 
culprits. As mentioned in Sec. 2.C, there exist several 
techniques to hide the factory-assigned MAC address. 
However, if the candidate MAC addresses of the culprit’s 
device can be enumerated, we consider that this information 
can help with criminal investigation as follows: 
1) When the MAC address of a certain person’s mobile 
device is included in the list of candidate MAC addresses, 
this points to the likelihood of that person being the culprit, 
an accomplice, eyewitness, or a victim of the incident. 
2) When candidate MAC addresses are enumerated, the 
device owner’s usual appearance can be obtained by 
monitoring the candidate addresses in several surveillance 
areas. In the case that the person’s appearance is similar to 
the culprit’s appearance, the person is likely to be the culprit 
of the incident. In the case that the appearance has little in 
common with the culprit’s appearance seen around the scene 
of the incident, the MAC address must be regarded as that of 
a bystander’s device. 
 
Intended users and incident types of the proposed system are 
as follows. 
 
 Intended users: 
• Facility administrators (when the surveillance area 
consists of private buildings, e.g., shopping malls, 
company office) 
• Local police or security companies (when the area is 
public, e.g., station square, park) 
 
Intended incident types: 
• Personal or property crimes (e.g., shoplifting, graffiti, 
larceny) 
 
A. System outline 
This system employs PCWL-0200 [9] as APs to gather 
“radiowave fingerprints” and a USB camera mounted on each 
AP to shoot images around it. These radiowave fingerprints and 
images are transmitted to an administrative server along with an 
attached timestamp. When an incident occurs, the user of the 
Criminal Fishing System, for example, a facility administrator, 
checks the images to determine the duration of an incident. The 
system filters radiowave fingerprints observed during the 
period and enumerates candidate radiowave fingerprints of the 
culprit's device from a large number of obtained fingerprints. 
When the enumerated radiowave fingerprints are detected in 
another area, the appearance and the face of the device owner, 
that is, the candidate culprit can be recognized by camera 
images. This system can help accelerate crime investigations. 
Even if the detailed appearance of a culprit cannot be 
obtained around the scene of an incident, it can be obtained 
later in another place by surveilling the enumerated MAC 
addresses, namely, MAC address contained in the radiowave 
fingerprints, in several areas. When the MAC address is 
captured in an area, the appearance of the device owner can be 
obtained from camera image shot around there. The probability 
of identifying culprits can be improved by locating APs over 
wide areas with high density. 
B. System components 
Figure 1 shows the components of the system. The main 
components are administrative server, PCWL-0200 (Wi-Fi AP), 
and USB camera. Each AP gathers probe request signals, and 
periodically transmits “radiowave fingerprints” to the 
administrative server. Each AP executes “motion,” an 
image-capturing program that captures images when the 
program recognizes moving objects. These images are 
transmitted to the administrative server via a wireless backhaul 
network. The transmitted radiowave fingerprints and images 
are stored in the database on the server. To determine the 
culprit's device from a large volume of stored data, the 
administrative server is equipped with a web application. A 
facility administrator uses the web application to determine the 
duration for which the culprit stays around the scene of the 
incident by checking the stored images. The administrative 
server enumerates candidate MAC addresses of the culprit’s 
mobile device based on this duration. 
C. Culprit determination algorithm 
1) Outline of algorithm 
Because each AP gathers probe request signals from multiple 
devices, including the culprit's device and bystanders’ devices, 
the MAC addresses of the bystanders’ devices should be 
eliminated. These devices are roughly classified into the 
following 3 categories; “stable devices” are devices that stay at 
the same place, “long-distance devices” are devices that are 
located at some distance from the camera, and “short-distance 
devices” are devices that are located within a short distance 
from the camera. 
The MAC addresses of the stable devices are always 
observed by a certain AP regardless of time. By contrast, the 
device of the culprit eventually moves away from the scene of 
the incident, and its MAC address is not observed by the AP 
after a while. Therefore, stable devices can be eliminated by 
determining the duration for which the culprit stays around the 
scene of the incident from camera images and eliminating the 
MAC addresses observed after the culprit has fled. 
The long-distance devices are located far from the AP, and 
the RSSI of the signals emitted from these devices will be lower 
than that of the culprit's device. Therefore, these devices can be 
eliminated by setting a lower limit threshold on the RSSI of the 
probe request signals. 
Short-distance devices can be categorized into “partially 
short-distance devices,” the device of the person that behaves 
different to the culprit in the area of other APs, and “fully 
short-distance devices,” the device of the person that behaves 
similarly to the culprit in the area of other APs. The partially 
short-distance devices can be eliminated by extracting MAC 
addresses corresponding to the time when the culprit stays 
around each AP distributed around the area and by eliminating 
the MAC addresses that are not commonly observed by all 
target APs. In case of the fully short-distance devices, it is 
considered not necessary to eliminate them because these 
radiowave fingerprints indicate the devices of accomplices or 
those of the victims of the incident, which are useful for 
determining the culprit. In case that the addresses of entirely 
unrelated persons exist, they can be eliminated as follows. 
When the MAC addresses were observed at a place, their 
appearance can be seen by checking the images shot at the place. 
If they can be recognized as unrelated persons by checking 
 
Fig. 1. Criminal fishing system. Each access point gathers probe request 
signals broadcast by surrounding devices. These signals and images 
captured around each AP are transmitted to the administrative server via a 
wireless backhaul network. 
 images taken around other APs, their address can be eliminated 
from the candidate list. 
In terms of the filtering method, we need to discuss two 
performance indices: culprit detection rate and misdetection 
rate of other persons. The occurrence of a misdetection means 
that an innocent bystander might be treated as a culprit. This 
would increase the psychological resistance to implementation 
of the proposed system. It is essential to get a nod from 
community residents before introducing the system for 
practical use. Therefore, a low misidentification rate should be 
achieved, in addition to achieving high identification rate of the 
culprit. Based on this concept, the linear weighting method is 
developed. 
2) Linear weighted filtering 
“Linear weighted filtering” is a method to obtain candidate 
MAC addresses of a culprit’s mobile device from a multitude of 
probe request signals. Linear weighted filtering uses the 
“suspicious rate,” an index that shows the probability that a 
given MAC address is the one of the culprit’s device. The 
suspicious rate is calculated for each MAC address based on the 
time at which the address was observed. 
Linear weighted filtering calculates the difference among the 
MAC addresses observed during the “culprit staying duration” 
and that observed during the “culprit non-staying duration” 
(Fig. 2). These durations are defined by determining the times 
at which a culprit enters and exits the vicinity of a given 
incident scene. The stored photos are used to determine the 
durations. Because the addresses included in the differential set 
are likely to be the culprit’s, the filtering method increments 
their suspicious rate. This method divides the culprit 
non-staying duration into intervals 30 s length and performs 
this calculation for each time slot.  
The probability that the culprit’s fingerprint will be collected 
by an AP around an incident scene is expected to decrease 
relative to the time elapsed from which the culprit was 
recognized as being in the given location. Therefore, the 
accuracy of culprit identification can be improved by 
increasing the value to be incremented by the “suspicious rate” 
relative to the time elapsed since the culprit staying duration, as 
follows. In this formula, n indicates the number of time slots, 
numbered from each end of the culprit' staying duration. 
 
We refer to this weighting method as “linear weighting” 
because the value is linearly increased according to the time 
elapsed since the culprit’s staying duration, as shown in Fig. 3. 
The addresses with the maximum RSSI values during the 
culprit staying duration and the maximum suspicious rates 
greater than the threshold are extracted as candidate MAC 
addresses. The filtering results are presented in a table that 
consists of a MAC address, its suspicious rate for each AP, and 
sum of the rates. When several addresses appear in the 
candidate list, an administrator can determine the MAC address 
 
Fig. 2. Calculation of suspicious rate. The suspicious rate is the index 
showing the probability that a given MAC address is the culprit’s address. 
It is calculated based on the appearance of each MAC address around the 
time of a given incident. 
 
Fig. 4. Query input screen of Criminal Fishing web application. Facility 
administrator inputs surveillance area, AP identifier, date, and approximate 
time upon acknowledging the occurrence of a criminal incident. 
 
Fig. 3. Change in linear weighting over time. The value is increased 
according to the time elapsed since the culprit staying duration. 
 that most likely belongs to the culprit by referring to the 
suspicious rates. 
D. Criminal Fishing web application 
This system collects many photos shot around several APs. 
To find appropriate photos for determining the culprit staying 
duration, we developed the Criminal Fishing web application. 
This application shows candidate photos by inputting 
surveillance area, AP identifier, date, and approximate time 
(Fig. 4). Detailed culprit staying duration is determined by 
choosing an appropriate photo from the candidate photos 
shown in the list view (Fig. 5). The Criminal Fishing System 
extracts candidate MAC addresses from the culprit staying 
duration. By executing the same procedures on each AP that the 
culprit has passed in a certain surveillance area, candidate 
MAC address are output as the filtering result. 
IV. PRELIMINARY EXPERIMENT 
A preliminary experiment was conducted to examine 
whether the proposed system can enumerate the MAC address 
of the culprit’s device from a list of candidate addresses. This 
experiment was performed in an experimental environment, in 
which a culprit held a mobile device that broadcast probe 
request signals frequently with the factory-assigned MAC 
address. 
A. Experimental settings 
In this experiment, a surveillance area was set up with six 
APs, as shown in Fig. 6. Specifically, one AP called the “core” 
was used to aggregate data communication to the database 
server, and the other five APs called “slaves” captured probe 
request signals. Because the image-capturing program is 
computational resource-heavy, it may interrupt APs’ 
communication functions. To prevent this, five single-board 
computers (four PandaBoards [10] and one Raspberry Pi [11]) 
were used to capture photos with the USB cameras. Each pair 
of single-board computer and slave AP was placed at a given 
location. A simulated culprit held a mobile device with 
functional Wi-Fi and walked along a predefined route that 
passed all slave APs, while trying to blend into the crowd. The 
experiment was performed 10 times using 10 different devices. 
We consider that this number of trials is adequate for a 
preliminary experiment. The aim is to evaluate the basic 
functionality of the proposed system, and further evaluation 
should be done in a more practical environment. The candidate 
MAC addresses of culprit’s device were enumerated using the 
Criminal Fishing System web application. 
B. Experimental results 
In this experiment, “radiowave fingerprints” of two (2 out of 
10) devices were not observed on any AP, and not all 
single-board computers were able to capture images of the 
culprit. We believe that image capture failed because of the 
instability of the single-board computer, unstable signal 
strength, and so on. These problems can occur in more practical 
environments as well.  
Table 2 lists the experimental results. The proposed method 
succeeded in enumerating the MAC address of the culprit's 
device 8 out of 8 times, that is, the culprit’s mobile device 
 
Fig. 6. Placement of APs in experiment. We use six Wi-Fi APs in the 
experiment; one AP is used for aggregating communication with the 
database server, and the other five capture probe request signals. 
TABLE I 
SPECIFICATION OF THE EXPERIMENT 
Experiment place Open Learning Plaza, Kyushu University 
Ito campus 
equipment PCWL-0200: 6 
(1 for data communicationaggregation 
5 for capturing Probe Request signals) 
Pandaboard: 4 
Raspberry Pi: 1 
USBcamera: 5 
Data server (CentOS): 1 
Wi-Fi devices: 10 
 
 
Fig. 5. List view of candidate photos. Detailed culprit staying duration at 
a certain AP is determined by choosing an appropriate photo. 
TABLE II 
RESULTS OF EXPERIMENT 
Trial 
No. 
No. of enumerated 
MAC/No. of all 
observed MACs 
No. of APs used 
for 
identification 
Identifiability 
of culprit 
1 1／60 4 ○ 
2 1／54 5 ○ 
3 1／62 3 ○ 
4 0／31 4 - 
5 1／41 5 ○ 
6 1／42 4 ○ 
7 1／40 3 ○ 
8 1／35 2 ○ 
9 0／35 3 - 
10 1／54 2 ○ 
 
 broadcast probe request signals. In the fourth and the ninth 
trials, the proposed system was able to prevent false detection 
of the MAC address of a bystanders’ device. However, because 
the culprit's device did not broadcast probe request signals, the 
system was not able to observe the MAC address of the 
culprit’s device. “No. of APs used in identification” indicates 
that the number of the APs that were able to capture images. 
The maximum number was five in this experiment. 
The experimental results show that the proposed system can 
find the MAC address of the culprit's device by fusing probe 
request signals and camera images. 
V. DISCUSSION 
A. Ethical issues of proposed system 
As mentioned in Sec. 3, the main purpose of the proposed 
system is to enumerate candidate MAC addresses of a culprit’s 
mobile device. A MAC address by itself is not an identifier of a 
person. However, when a malicious user spies and obtains a 
target person’s MAC address, the malicious user can track the 
target by using said address. To prevent the Criminal Fishing 
System from being accessed by unintended users, the criminal 
fishing server and the APs set up a surveillance area should be 
located on same and closed local area network. 
In addition, we must deal with privacy issues. Although a 
MAC address is not a direct identifier of any person, it is 
correlated to a certain person strongly. In the case of 
factory-assigned MAC address, it is definitely unique to each 
device, and a mobile device travels along with its owner. If the 
mobile device can be tracked, the owner of the device can be 
tracked. Although MAC address is not regarded as personal 
information in most countries, we should notify that the 
Criminal Fishing System is in operation in a given surveillance 
area. 
B. Effects of MAC address spoofing and randomization 
We should consider how the proposed system works if a 
culprit has a mobile device with a spoofed or randomized MAC 
address. In short, MAC spoofing and randomization have no 
critical effect on this system. However, these technologies 
sometimes trigger frequent changes of MAC address, which 
undeniably affects the proposed system. In the case that a MAC 
address is changed very frequently, for example, every few 
minutes, it cannot be enumerated as one of the candidate MAC 
addresses. However, according to the preliminary experiment, 
the proposed system can avoid enumerating the MAC 
addresses of bystanders’ mobile devices. Therefore, it can 
prevent innocent bystanders from being entangled into a 
criminal investigation. 
Depending on the frequency of MAC address change, the 
proposed system can assist criminal investigation as follows. If 
the MAC address is not changed in several days (may be 
several hours), the whereabouts of the device owner, that is, 
candidate culprit, can be obtained by monitoring the MAC 
address in several areas. In this manner, the system can assist 
criminal investigations, even if the MAC address is been 
changed before candidate culprit is questioned about the 
incident. In the case that the MAC address is rarely changed, 
regardless of whether it is factory-assigned or spoofed, this 
MAC address itself can be admissible as evidence that the 
person was present at the scene when the incident occurred. 
Currently, MAC address randomization algorithms and their 
implementation differ across operating systems. A single 
standardized and secure randomization method has not been 
established. According to [8], several vulnerabilities remain in 
MAC address randomization, and some studies [12][13] have 
dealt with target device tracking regardless of whether the 
device randomizes its MAC address. 
C. Social effects of proposed system 
This section discusses the social effects of the proposed 
system, independent of the MAC randomization or spoofing 
issues discussed in Sec. 5.B. 
The experimental results demonstrated that the proposed 
system can find the MAC address of a culprit’s mobile device 
accurately when the culprit has a device with active Wi-Fi. 
According to the literature [1], 3.4 billion smartphones are used 
actively worldwide, and mobile broadband subscriptions have 
reached 3.6 billion. In short, nearly half of the world’s 
population uses devices that broadcast probe request signals. 
Based on the experimental results, the proposed system can 
identify the MAC addresses of approximately 50% of the 
people in the area covered by APs capable of capturing probe 
request signals. In urban areas, many Wi-Fi APs are being 
installed, and these APs will be replaced with more 
sophisticated APs in the near future. Therefore, the system is 
anticipated to be effective for approximately one-half of the 
criminal incidents that occur in urban areas. It will be a strong 
deterrent against criminal incidents in cities. Moreover, we 
believe that the proposed AP-based criminal prevention system 
is beneficial because culprits will be unaware of the locations of 
the APs and connection status of their smartphones when 
perpetrating criminal activities.  
D. Other issues for practical use 
We consider that there remain two major issues before 
introducing the proposed system into practical use. The first is 
the failure to capture “radiowave fingerprint” from the culprit's 
device. In the experiment, the device held by the simulated 
culprit was set to emit probe request signals frequently to 
ensure that the APs captured the “radiowave fingerprint.” 
Sometimes, however, some APs are able to capture the culprit's 
“radiowave fingerprint” and others are not in practical 
situations. Currently, the proposed method can identify MAC 
address of the culprit's device only when all APs that have 
captured the culprit’s image succeed in capturing the signal. 
The other issue is that the misdetection rate increases as the 
number of APs that can be used to identify the culprit's 
“radiowave fingerprint” decreases. In the experiments, the 
simulated culprit walked around the surveillance area passing 
many APs. However, a real culprit would not always move 
around the area while passing near the APs. The culprit 
identification rate of the proposed system is expected to 
decrease in such situations. By contrast, the number of APs 
 used for culprit identification can be used as an index to 
measure the reliability of the identification result. We believe 
that they can help innocent bystanders from being entangled in 
criminal investigations, not only by referring to the detected 
results of the proposed system but also considering the number 
of APs that captured the culprit's “radiowave fingerprint.” 
VI. CONCLUSION 
We presented the Criminal Fishing System, which uses 
radiowave fingerprints gathered by densely placed APs. 
Specifically, this system enumerates candidate MAC addresses 
of a culprit’s mobile device based on the suspicious rate, which 
is calculated on the basis of the appearance of each MAC 
address around the time of a given incident. A preliminary 
experiment demonstrated that the proposed system can find the 
MAC address of a culprit’s device by fusing probe request 
signals and camera images. These results indicate that Wi-Fi 
based target tracking and camera-based monitoring have a 
certain level of utility in investigating crimes. 
In the future, we plan to improve the proposed system by 
testing it in a more practical environment, modifying it for use 
in the context of specific types of incidents. The existing 
algorithm of the proposed system is not intended for any 
dedicated type of crimes. We consider that the accuracy of our 
system can be improved by considering criminal 
characteristics. 
In addition, we would like to incorporate the anti-MAC 
spoofing/randomization techniques mentioned in Sec. 5 B into 
our proposed system and evaluate the effects of doing so on our 
Criminal Fishing System. We believe that accurate target 
tracking using Wi-Fi signals can improve the accuracy and the 
utility of the proposed system. 
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